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Abstract
Modern monetary policymakers consider a huge amount of information in their evaluation
of events and contingencies. However, most research on monetary policy relies on simple rules,
and one relevant underpinning for this choice is the good empirical ￿t of the Taylor rule. This
paper challenges the solidness of this foundation. We model the Federal Reserve reaction function
during the Greenspan tenure as a Logistic Smoothing Transition Regime model in which a series
of economically meaningful transition variables drive the transition across monetary regimes and
allow the coe¢ cients of the rule to change over time. We argue that estimated linear rules are
weighted averages of the actual rules working in the diverse monetary regimes, where the weights
merely re￿ ect the length and not necessarily the relevance of the regimes. Thus, the actual presence
of ￿ner monetary policy regimes corrupts the general predictive and descriptive power of linear
Taylor-type rules.
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11 Introduction
Arguably, the main problem that monetary policy has to cope with is uncertainty. Alan
Greenspan, former President of the Federal Reserve, maintained that uncertainty leads to a
risk-management approach to policy in which ￿policymakers need to consider not only the
most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about
that path￿(Greenspan 2004 p. 37).
In understanding the risk management approach, it is useful to characterize ￿general un-
certainty￿in terms of Knightian uncertainty and risk.1 A crucial component of Greenspan￿ s
legacy is the predisposition to consider general uncertainty as an important determinant of
monetary policy decision making. The management of general uncertainty, i.e. the manage-
ment of the ￿continuum ranging from well-de￿ned risk to the truly unknown￿ (Greenspan
2004, p. 37), represents the core of the so-called risk-management approach he adopted in his
tenure. One consequence is that simple rules are likely doomed to miss changes in the mone-
tary policy conduct driven by risk-management considerations. Those considerations consist
of the judgment exercised in evaluating "the risks of di⁄erent events and the probability that
our actions will alter those risks" (Greenspan 2004, p. 38).
A monetary policy regime can be de￿ned as the way policymakers address the issue of
the instrument choice in order to reach one or more targets. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that monetary policy is sensitive to special events and contingencies. Considering the recent
monetary history of the US, examples of both were, amongst others, the crash in assets
prices that occurred in 1987 and 2000, the acceleration in productivity in the mid-1990s, the
Russian debt default in 1998 and the risk of de￿ ation in 2002-3. If a set of one or more events
and/or contingencies signi￿cantly modi￿es the way policy decisions are made, then a monetary
policy regime switch occurs. Put another way, a policy regime switch is characterized by a
change in the way monetary policy is conducted due to the occurrence of a set of events
and/or contingencies. Accordingly, each monetary regime is characterized by a diverse rule
of conduct that distinguishes it from the others.2 Thus, considering contingencies and special
events, the risk-management approach to monetary policy implies that "the decision makers
need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs and bene￿ts of the various possible
outcomes under alternative choices for policy" (Greenspan 2004 p. 37).
1.1 The issue
Given that uncertainty-related concerns drive the changes in the policy stance, the importance
of a monetary regime is not characterized by its time length, but, rather, by the impact of
the event or the contingency on the behaviour of the policymakers. This de￿nition of policy
regime is more re￿ned than the usual one, according to which established relations holding
on a su¢ ciently long period of time are required to identify a regime. On the contrary, in this
new de￿nition, sudden events and contingencies that a⁄ect policy are su¢ cient to generate a
regime switch.
Now, in an environment strongly characterized by uncertainty, to what extent, if any, can
a linear monetary policy like the Taylor rule, provide guidance ex ante or only describe ex
post the behavior of the central bank (CB hereafter)? To what extent ￿ner regimes matter?
A ￿narrative answer￿to this question is provided directly by the former Fed President:
1Knight￿ s (1921) seminal dissertation splits general uncertainty into two distinct types of uncertainty: "risk" which is
randomness with knowable probabilities, and therefore in principle eliminable, and "uncertainty" which is randomness
with unknowable probabilities and therefore not eliminable.
2It is worth stressing that, while policymakers can observe real events, contingencies are more di¢ cult to deal with
because they may entail both risk (i.e. the probability distribution of outcomes is known) and uncertainty (i.e. probability
distribution of outcomes is unknown).
2"Indeed rules that relate the setting of the federal funds rate to the deviations of
output and in￿ ation from their respective targets, in some con￿gurations, do seem
capture the broad contours of what we did over the past decade and a half. And
the prescriptions of formal rules can, in fact, serve as helpful adjuncts to policy
[...]. But at crucial points, like those in our recent policy history - the stock market
crash of 1987, the crises of 1997-98, and the events that followed September 2001
- simple rules will be inadequate as either descriptions and prescriptions of policy.
Moreover, such rules su⁄er much of the same ￿xed-coe¢ cient di¢ culties we have
with our large-scale models" (Greenspan, 2004 p. 38-39).
A theoretical answer to this question is in the academic literature as well. Svensson (2003)
argues that targeting rules allow a modelization of the monetary policy that is much closer
to the monetary policy practice than instrument rules. In particular, they permit rational
exploitation of all the information that the central bank has access to, but that is outside the
scope of the model used to describe the economy. This information is distilled in what can
be interpreted as the judgment of the central bank, which seems to be a crucial ingredient in
the risk-management approach proposed by Greenspan.3
The aforementioned answers point to important limits of simple linear rules ￿ la Taylor.
Yet, we do not know to what extent, in practice, these limits matter. Furthermore, the larger
part of the monetary policy literature uses this type of rules.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative answer to these questions focusing on
special circumstances about which we have narrative and anecdotal evidence. If simple rules
(as the Taylor rule) characterize well the overall Greenspan￿ s tenure, then the management of
special events and contingencies is of second order relevance. Instead, if the presence of ￿ner
regimes is a pervasive feature of the monetary policy, then a Taylor-type reaction function is
somehow misleading. A targeting rule including judgment would probably be more e⁄ective
to model the risk-management paradigm proposed by Greenspan.
It is worth noting that a policy rule maps the operating monetary regime into a relation
that links the policy instrument with the bank￿ s targets, or with their determinants. Building
on this, we argue that if we empirically identify a change in the policy rule occurring in
correspondence of an event and/or a contingency, we are also identifying a policy regime
switch. While Greenspan has provided a narrative account of whether and when the Federal
Reserve Bank has (and has not) undertaken such policy switches, the empirical literature
has not yet produced evidences on his account of the evolution of the US monetary policy
conduct. This paper aims to ￿ll this gap in the literature.
We address this issue by investigating what happens to Taylor-type rules once linearity is
not imposed to the speci￿cation. Speci￿cally, we use a logistic smooth transition regression
(LSTR) model, as developed by Terasvirta (1994) and improved by Van Dijk and Franses
(2000). Various scholars, among others Kesriyeli et al. (2006) and Martin and Milas (2004),
have already employed this type on non-linear econometric technique in monetary policy
analysis. Such LSTR technique allows us to pick possible nonlinear behaviours without im-
posing their existence on the basis of some a priori knowledge. Indeed, by resorting to a
LSTR model, we impose neither the existence of multiple regimes, nor the critical thresh-
olds above/below which the di⁄erent regimes take place. We do not impose the existence of
multiple regimes because the model is free to produce a linear estimation if it is the case.4
3Using simulations based on the Svensson and Rudebush (1999) model of the US economy, Svensson (2005) shows
that neglecting judgment as in the Taylor rule substantially worsens the monetary policy performance in terms of welfare.
4This is why we start from a linear estimation and extend it to a nonlinear environment, which almost preserves the
structural features of the linear one. It is worth noting that the LSTR methodology di⁄ers from a Markov-Switching
regimes estimation method, in that it requires that the regime changes are associated with the movements of a speci￿c
3We use this technique to detect deviations from the simple instrument rule and, when
possible, to ￿nd the speci￿c rule that characterizes a regime. Indeed, since the information
that the central bank uses in judgment is often not available in the data5, econometrics cannot
always deliver the rule that captures the policymakers￿behaviour in the ￿ner regimes. Yet,
in those cases, nonlinear econometrics allows us to ￿nd at least how many times and to what
extent deviations from the simple average instrument rule occur.
The contribution of this paper is to show that, empirically, ￿ner regimes exist and map
into behaviors that di⁄er from what is suggested by linear Taylor-type rules. The STR
technique allows to detect endogenously regimes that by construction linear econometrics is
doomed to miss. We provide evidence for a sequence of regimes that di⁄er from the Taylor
rule based on evidence drawn from analysis of the 18-year Greenspan era.6 Since estimation
over a sequence of regimes provides an average rule, the bottom line is that the presence
of various ￿ner regimes corrupts the predictive and descriptive power of the linear Taylor
rule. Indeed, when ￿ner regimes occurring in the face of special events and contingencies
are considered together, the individual rules are shaken in a cocktail that averages out to
the Taylor rule. For this reason, we believe that, when a su¢ ciently long period containing
various regimes is considered, linear estimations tend to approximate to the Taylor rule. Yet
these estimations lead to an average rule that, by hiding the speci￿c rules occurring in the
various regimes, loses utility directly with the di⁄erences among the regimes. Furthermore,
since contingencies are an important ingredient of new regimes, and contingencies proliferate
with uncertainty, it follows that a linear rule ￿ la Taylor is doomed to lose utility along with
growth in uncertainty in the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section two, we brie￿ y introduce the main features
of Taylor-type rules and their major shortcomings. Then, in Section three we present the
results of the linear estimations. The forth section is devoted to a brief description of the
LSTAR speci￿cation that is the nonlinear estimation technique we use. In the following
Section we report the results of the tests of nonlinearity. In the sixth Section we report the
actual estimates of nonlinear Taylor rules and provide some comments on the results. Here,
we focus on the ZLB contingency, the stock market crash in 2000 and the alleged stock market
bubble in the late 90s. The seventh section is devoted to the discussion of the importance of
choosing meaningful transition variables and the appropriateness of those employed in this
work. We conclude with some general considerations about the implications of our ￿ndings
on the meaning and utility of linear Taylor-type instrument rules.
2 The Taylor rule as an interpretative tool
The monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) is:
it = r￿ + ￿t + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿yyt
where i is the federal funds rate, r￿ is the equilibrium real federal funds rate, ￿t the average
in￿ ation rate over the contemporaneous and prior three quarters (GDP de￿ ator), ￿￿ the
variable with respect to a threshold. The LSTR model better ￿ts our analysis since we believe that asset price misalign-
ments and the declining distance between the nominal interest rate and the zero lower bound are the relevant variables
leading the switches in the Fed￿ s monetary policy stance, at least during some of the considered periods.
5King (2005) notes that the productivity acceleration in the US that started in 1995 was not visible until the vintages
released in 1998. Yet, by talking and listening to people who work in business, already in May 1996 Greenspan accessed
this information and exploited it to correct the forecast of the Fed￿ s model.
6Several papers (for instance, Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Du⁄y and Engle-Warnick (2005), and Owyang and Ramey
(2005)) have emphasized the existence of structural changes in the monetary policy corresponding to the appointments
of the various Chairmen. We extend this line of research, focusing exclusively on the Greenspan era.
4targeting in￿ ation rate, and yt the output gap.
Taylor suggests that expressing the federal funds rate in terms of the aforementioned linear
function is not only a good description of Fed￿ s monetary policy, but also a reasonable policy
recommendation for central bankers committed to maintaining a low in￿ ation environment.
Not everybody has agreed with such claim, yet the extent of the disagreement varies between
authors.7 While some have criticized the limited prescriptive use of the Taylor rules8, other
researchers have stressed the existence of possible empirical shortcomings.9 Notwithstanding
all these critiques, after its ￿rst formulation, the Taylor rule has probably become one of
the most investigated and estimated relationship in economics. All in all, the Taylor rule
is considered an important benchmark both for the design of policy rules and for the ex-
post empirical investigations of past monetary policy decisions. This is in line with the two
hypotheses at the basis of this work: Taylor-type rules manage to detect the broad contours
of monetary policy decisions but, to say it with Svensson, do not capture their judgment
component. Building on this observation, our investigation focuses on the critical fact that
their linear form prevents them from detecting potential signi￿cant switches in the monetary
policy stance over time.
A common modi￿cation of the classical Taylor rule is the addition of at least one lagged
interest rate term. The reasons for doing so belong to both the theoretical and the empirical
realms. From the empirical point of view, the estimation of a classical Taylor rule generates
highly serially correlated residuals which can be dealt with by adding some lags of the de-
pendent variable among the regressors. From the theoretical point of view, there are several
reasons for expecting monetary authorities to change the interest rates only gradually. In
brief, it seems that a common denominator of these reasons is a trade-o⁄ between the CB
speed in a⁄ecting the economy and the e⁄ectiveness of the monetary policy.10 In line with
such arguments, we can think that the CB sets the interest rate as a weighted average of the
target rate and the last period(s) rate(s). This can be written as:
it = (1 ￿ ￿)e it + ￿it￿1 (1)
where, assuming a contemporaneous rule, the target rate is e it = ￿ + ￿￿(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿yyt:
In the empirical literature, the coe¢ cient ￿ is found to be fairly large (close to 1) and
highly signi￿cant for any time period and country. This supports the idea that CBs adjust
the interest rate with a certain inertia, or, alternatively, that the interest rates move rather
smoothly. However, Rudebusch (2002) observes that, while interest rate smoothing would
7For instance, Kozicki (1999) argues that Taylor-type rules do not produce useful recommendations because they are
not robust to changes in the details of their speci￿cation and to alternative measures of their determinants.
8Svensson (2003a p. 428) argues that "..the rule is incomplete: some deviations are allowed but there are no rules
for when deviations from the instrument rules are appropriate". Woodford (2001 p. 236) argues, for instance, that "the
Taylor rule incorporates several features of an optimal monetary policy, from the standpoint of at least one simple class
of optimizing models. The response that it prescribes to ￿uctuations in in￿ation or the output gap tends to stabilize
those variables, and stabilization of both variables is an appropriate goal, at least when the output gap is properly
de￿ned. Furthermore, the prescribed response to these variables counteracts dynamics that could otherwise generate
instability due to self-ful￿lling expectations". He also argues, however, that "at the same time, the original formulation
may be improved upon."
9Several authors have raised concerns also regarding the possibility of drawing conclusions about past policy decisions
on the basis of estimated Taylor-type rules. For instance, Orphanides (1998) notes that the use of ex-post revised data
in estimating Taylor Rules may lead to very di⁄erent conclusions from those obtainable resorting to real-time data.
The time series properties of the variables (which may possibly lead to spurious regressions), the ad hoc speci￿cation of
the functional form, the instability of the parameters and the sample selection biases are problematic issues still largely
debated in the literature. See, for instance, Siklos and Wohar (2005).
10In the appendix we o⁄er an overview of most of the rationales identi￿ed to explain the CBs￿ interest smoothing
motives. For a thorough discussion on this issue see Lowe and Ellis (1997), Rudebusch (1995, 2001, 2002), Gerlach-
Kristen (2004), Woodford (2001, 2003a, b), Amato and Laubach (1999), Orphanides (1998), Sack and Wieland (2000),
Aoki (2003), Goodfriend (1987, 1991), Cuckierman (1996), Roley and Sellon (1995), Levin, Wielandand Williams (1999),
Bullard and Schaling (2002), Caplin and Leahy (1996), Goodhart (1999), Kuttner (2001), Svensson (2003a).
5imply that the interest rates are quite predictable, actual data do not exhibit such a feature.
Accordingly, he suggests that, in fact, there is no interest rate smoothing at a quarterly
frequency, but rather highly permanent shocks to which CBs respond. It is the persistent
nature of the shocks that motivates the persistence of the interest rates11. He concludes that
lagged interest rates into the Taylor rule possibly re￿ ect an omitted variables problem rather
than a truly smoothing (or partial adjustment) behaviour of the CB. Such conclusions are
challenged by English et al. (2002) and Castelnuovo (2003), who test the existence of interest
rate smoothing at quarterly frequencies in forward looking Taylor rules. Castelnuovo concludes
that both serial correlation (due to persistent omitted variables) and authentic interest rate
smoothing are supported by the data.12 Gerlach-Kristen (2004) follows a di⁄erent approach
and arrives to very similar conclusions. Therefore, from a purely econometric viewpoint,
lagged interest rates in the Taylor rule remain a plausible means to capture the interest rate
inertia present in the data, but they might also hide an omitted variable problem.
In order to take this much debated and (still) unsettled issue into account, in what fol-
lows we estimate several di⁄erent speci￿cations of linear Taylor rules, which all encompass a
smoothing (i.e. autoregressive) part and some of them include additional explanatory vari-
ables, so-called Taylor-type rules.
The dynamic speci￿cation of the Taylor rule is extremely important in our work. A
correct speci￿cation of the linear model is necessary if we want to econometrically test for the
presence of nonlinearity. Heteroskedasticity and residual serial autocorrelation tend to lead
to the over-rejection of the correct hypothesis of model linearity and, therefore, it is crucial
to encompassing a smoothing component. From both LM tests for serial correlation and the
inspection of the ACF and the PACF, it turns out that in our sample, two autoregressive terms
are necessary to get rid of any serial autocorrelation in the errors of the considered Taylor-type
rules. Accordingly, we set a speci￿cation of the Taylor-type equations that encompasses two
lagged interest rates 13.
3 The data and the linear estimation
We use US quarterly data from 1988:Q3 to 2004:Q1.14 All the series have been downloaded
from the web-site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis with the exception of the S&P500
series and the stock returns, computed on the basis of the S&P500 series, which have been
downloaded from Datastream.
As a measure of in￿ ation, following Taylor (1993), Judd and Rudebush (1998) and many
other authors, we use the average over the contemporaneous and the three lags of the four-
quarter in￿ ation rate (￿t =
P3
i=0 ￿t￿i=4). The quarterly in￿ ation rate ￿s, in its turn, is
constructed as follows: ￿s ￿ (ps ￿ps￿1); where ps = 100￿lnPs and Ps is the GDP chain-type
price index. The output gap yt is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the log of the real GDP
level and the log of the real potential GDP, as estimated by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce.15
11He supports such a claim on the basis of the term structure of the interest rates and of a direct test (on a nested
model in levels) on the interest rate smoothing against serial correlation hypothesis.
12Welz and Osterholm (2005) argue that the test employed by Castelnuovo and English et al. is not robust and tends
to overreject the hypothesis of serial autocorrelation. This ￿nding certainly casts some doubts on the strength of the
conclusions reached on the basis of their tests, yet not on the existence of the interest rate smoothing itself.
13The presence of two lagged interest rates is not new in the literature, see for instance Judd and Rudebusch (1998), and
Woodford (2003a p. 41), which proposes to rewrite the speci￿cation above as it = (1￿￿1)(e it)+￿1it￿1+￿2(it￿1￿it￿2);
where ￿1 = ￿1 + ￿2 and ￿2 = ￿￿2. The interest rate is set in response to changes in the level of e it according to the
partial adjustment mechanism above.
14This is the sample of observations we get after adjustments. The actual starting point of the original sample is
1987:Q4 since we focus only on the "Greenspan￿ s leadership" in order to avoid to capture regime switching related to
compositional changes of the Federal Open Market Committee.
15We borrow the de￿nitions from Castelnuovo (2003).
6Since we are focusing on the US, as measure of the interest rates we use the Federal Funds
rates.
We estimate the non-augmented linear model in the following form:
it = a + b￿￿t + byyt + ￿1it￿1 + ￿2it￿2 + ￿t (2)
where the coe¢ cients b￿ and by are implicitly de￿ned.
The OLS estimates16 of the coe¢ cients of this linear non-augmented speci￿cation are
reported in the second and third columns of Table 1. The degree of interest rate smoothing,
equal to the sum of the ￿s, is 0:8421 and satis￿es the necessary condition for the stationarity
of the Funds rate series. The estimated coe¢ cients reported in Table 1 are not far from
the values one would expect from the estimation of a Taylor rule. In the non-augmented
speci￿cation, the long run (LR) coe¢ cient for in￿ ation is very close to Taylor￿ s prediction
(i.e. 1.5), whereas the LR coe¢ cient of the output gap is above the "suggested" 0.517.18 The
residuals from the regression of equation (2) are plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. OLS Residuals from a linear non-augmented Taylor rule
At ￿rst sight, the rule seems to capture well the behaviour of the authorities, however it is
noteworthy that the residuals are consecutively and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in more
than one quarter, namely in 1991, 1994-1996 and in the period 1999-2002. Negative residuals
correspond to periods in which the estimated rule is conducive to ￿tted federal fund rates
higher than the actual ones.19 According to this ￿nding, in those periods the US monetary
policy seems to have been relaxed beyond what was suggested by the in￿ ation and the output
gap deviations.
The behaviour of the residuals suggests that the non-augmented linear speci￿cation does
not perfectly catch the actual behaviour of US monetary authorities. The mere inspection
of the graph does not allow one to say whether this limited ability to replicate the data is
related to omitted signi￿cant variables and/or to the imposition of a linear and time invariant
speci￿cation of the model. We investigate these possibilities ￿rstly by augmenting the basic
16At this stage we could estimate the linear Taylor rule by means of alternative econometric techniques, as for instance
OLS and GMM. We directly start with an OLS estimation because GMM is not e¢ cient in samples as small as this one,
and the selection of the instruments is (somehow obscurely) driving the results.
17A joint Wald test on ￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿y = 0:5 leads to reject the null hypothesis. However, performing two disjoint
tests for the two hypotheses originates a controversial result. The null hypothesis of an output coe¢ cient equal 0.5 is
rejected, while the hypothesis for the in￿ation coe¢ cient cannot be rejected.
18As Yellen (2004, p. 46) notes, since movements in unemployment commonly lead in￿ation, the high coe¢ cient of the
unemployment gap in the Taylor rule means that the Greenspan Fed typically behaved preemptively. This explanation
also applies to the high coe¢ cient of the output gap in the estimation of the Taylor rule we report.
19For positive residuals, the opposite reasoning holds.
7rule with additional (possibly omitted) variables, then by considering a nonlinear form of the
augmented and non-augmented speci￿cations.
In this section we exclusively focus on the linear speci￿cations. The linear augmented
Taylor-type rule we estimate is:
it = a + b￿￿t + byyt + !0
zzt + ￿1it￿1 + ￿2it￿2 + ￿t (3)
where zt is a vector of additional variables that can be signi￿cantly added so as to augment the
classical Taylor functional form. Following economic intuition and the results of Castelnuovo
(2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004), we consider among the possible additional variables the
spread between the Moody￿ s BAA corporate bond index yield and 10-year US Treasury note
yields (i.e. z2). We also include the di⁄erence between the 10-year US Treasury note and the
1-year US Treasury note yields (i.e. z1).20 These variables are statistically signi￿cant and
improve the overall ￿t of the model as it can be seen from the values of the Akaike criteria
reported in the last row of Table 1.
Non augmented Augmented
Coefficient Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error LR-coefficient Value Value
a 0.3131 0.1254** 2.2465 0.3050*** c 1.9700 6.0212
bπ 0.2330 0.0857*** 0.4740 0.0804*** βπ 1.4660 1.2704
by 0.1555 0.0404*** 0.1092 0.0343*** βy 0.9780 0.2927
ωz1 -0.3476 0.0879*** βz1 -0.9317
ωz2 -0.4786 0.0694*** βz2 -1.2828
ρ1 1.4284 0.1018*** 0.9490 0.1105***
ρ2 -0.5873 0.0893*** -0.3221 0.0783***
Sum of squared residuals




Table 1.OLS estimations. (Where z1 is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the BAA spread)
It is worth noting that augmenting the Taylor rule by means of two additional regressors
reduces the degree of interest rate smoothing from 0.8411 to 0.6269. This ￿nding supports
the hypothesis that at least a part of the serial autocorrelation of the errors from the non-
augmented speci￿cation is due to omitted variables, and not to actual interest rate inertia. As
to the signs of the additional variables they follow economic reasoning. Finally, note that the
LR coe¢ cient of in￿ ation remains greater than 1, as it is in the non-augmented speci￿cation,
whereas the LR output gap coe¢ cient falls from 0.98 to 0.29. All in all, the augmented
speci￿cation seems preferable to the non-augmented one.
Figure 2 plots the residuals of the linear augmented speci￿cation (3). Apparently, the
addition of two explanatory variables has contributed to reducing the correlation in the errors
and the positive spikes in the period 1994-1996, yet it has not solved the series of statistically
signi￿cant negative residuals that are still present. In addition, augmenting the Taylor rule
20The BAA spread is a measure of credit risk. It is determined by the investors￿risk aversion and the solvency risk
of the companies issuing the assets encompassed in the index. When the spread widens, an aggregate negative shock is
likely to have hit (or it is expected to hit) the economy and/or the ￿nancial markets. The central bank usually reacts to
such kind of events by relaxing monetary policy. Therefore, we expect the variable to enter with a negative sign in the
Taylor-type rule. The spread between long and short yields, instead, is likely to re￿ect temporary changes in expected
in￿ation. If the investors expect the in￿ation rate to fall temporarily, they will also expect federal fund rates to go down.
Accordingly, they will invest so as to also reduce the 1 year yield. The 10 years yields will be almost una⁄ected since
the in￿ation and the interest rates are expected to go back to normality in the medium and long run. An increase in
the spread between the two yields is likely to reveal expectations of low in￿ation in the short term. If the central bank
also expects the in￿ation rate to temporarily fall, it often reduces the overnight interest rates. In accordance with this
reasoning, we expect the variable to enter with a negative sign in the Taylor-type rule.
8has led to signi￿cantly positive residuals in the period 2002-2003. Although the overall ￿t
of the rule is improved by the addition of two informative variables, this is not the case in
all periods and over certain time intervals the ￿tted interest rates signi￿cantly di⁄er from
the actual values. This suggests that linear Taylor-type rules, however de￿ned, are unable to
produce exact results at each point in time, and may instead yield signi￿cant errors: a more
￿ exible tool is required so as to let the rules change when certain circumstances occur.
Figure 2. OLS Residuals from the augmented Taylor rule.
4 The nonlinear model
Following closely the work of Van Dijk and Franses (2000) and Van Dijk et al. (2000) we
assume that the model to estimate looks like:
yt = ￿xt + "t; (4)
where xt is a vector of regressors which includes a constant, some explanatory variables and,
possibly, some lagged values of yt. The model in the equation above is characterized by the
linearity/constancy of the coe¢ cients ￿. A smooth transition (STR) model starts from the
assumption that there are (at least) two regimes with two di⁄erent sets of coe¢ cients: ￿1
and ￿2 and a transition variable which determines the movements across the regimes21.
In very general terms, a two-regime smooth transition model for a univariate series yt
observed at time t=1-p,1-(p-1),..-1,0,1,...T-1,T, is given by:
yt = ￿0
1xt(1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)) + ￿0
2xtG(lt;￿;c) + "t: (5)
The two sets of coe¢ cients, ￿1 and ￿2, characterize the two extreme regimes with the tran-
sition function, G(lt;￿;c), assuming that its edge values are 0 and 1. The variable lt is the
transition variable, the constant value c is the threshold and corresponds to the value of the
transition variable which separates one regime from the other. Instead, the constant ￿; is the
speed parameter, that determines how fast the transition between the regimes occurs. Both
c and ￿ are estimated by the model.
It is worth noting that di⁄erent functional forms of G(lt;￿;c) correspond to di⁄erent regime
switching behaviours. The most common ones are the exponential speci￿cation22, which is
21Note that it is this feature that distinguishes STR models from Markow Switching regimes models, where the
transition across regimes does not depend on a speci￿c variable. Some very recent papers have employed Markov
Switching regime models to detect the existence of multiple regimes in U.S. monetary policy. See for instance Owyang
and Ramey (2005), and Du⁄y and Engle-Warnick (2004).




9used when there is an interest in symmetric regimes associated with small and large absolute
values of the transition variable, and the logistic one. Since we exclude a symmetric behaviour,
in this work we only focus on the logistic transition function. This can be written as:
G(lt;￿;c) = (1 + expf￿￿(lt ￿ c)g)￿1; ￿ > 0
Interestingly, there are two alternative (compatible) interpretations of a STR model23. The
model can be seen as a regime switching representation that allows for two regimes, associated
with the extreme values (0,1) of the transition function G(lt;￿;c), where the transition from
the ￿rst to the second regime is smooth or, alternatively, as a "continuum" of regimes, each
associated with a di⁄erent value of G(lt;￿;c), between the extremes 0 and 1.
In practice, after having speci￿ed a linear model with the correct number of autoregressive
terms24, the null hypothesis of linearity is to be tested against the alternative of (STR)
nonlinearity. This test has to be repeated for all the possible transition variables, and those
for which the linear model is rejected have to be chosen as possible candidates. Once the
functional form of G(￿) is de￿ned, the parameters of the STR model have to be estimated by
means of a quasi-maximum likelihood technique. To conclude, the estimated model undergoes
a series of diagnostic tests. On the basis of the tests￿results, the model can be changed where
necessary and the cycle repeated.
In the next sections we will proceed along the guidelines above. We have already started es-
timating the linear model; therefore, we will pass now onto testing the assumption of linearity.
Following this, we will estimate the appropriate speci￿cation of the LSTAR model.25
5 Testing for the linearity of the model
Now, we move on to test the null hypothesis of the linearity of the model against a nonlinear
speci￿cation. We are interested in testing whether (i) extreme movements in the stock markets
or (ii) changes in the perceived risk to hitting the ZLB and end up in a liquidity trap have
temporarily a⁄ected the decisions of the Federal Reserve Bank. Given this goal, we ￿nd it is
convenient to resort to the STR estimation method and to impose to the estimation that the
nonlinearity (if any) has to be associated with, either (i) a stock market related variable or
(ii) a variable capturing the perceived risk of hitting the ZLB. Consistently, we run a series
of tests of linearity for a group of asset-prices related variables and the one-period lagged
interest rate (it￿1), and we select the variables which are more likely to drive regime switches.
As regards asset prices, we adopt diverse, stationary, measures of stock market returns.
We consider stock markets returns calculated over di⁄erent time horizons including both short
and long lasting stock market performance.26
We look at a quarterly measure of monthly returns (ret1m) calculated on the S&P500
index, the quarterly returns (ret3m), the 6-month returns (ret6m) and the moving average
23Other models tackle the possible existence of multiple regimes in alternative fashions. Researchers, for instance,
are quite familiar with threshold autoregressive (TAR) models. A STAR model di⁄ers from a TAR model in the way
the switches between regimes occur. In a STAR model the transition is smooth, with a speed that is estimated on a
case-by-case basis. In a TAR model, instead, an abrupt change across regimes is imposed. It follows that STAR models
involve less restrictions than TAR models, as they relax the requirements on the speed of transition (which is in￿nite in
the TAR case), and consequently, nest the TAR speci￿cations
24Since the rejection of linearity could stem from the misspeci￿cation of the linear model (see Van Dijk et al. 2000),
the linear functional form has to be carefully characterised.
25To produce the nonlinear estimations we have modi￿ed the GAUSS codes on "Regime-Switching Models for Returns"
written by Van Dick and available on his web site.
26We focus on stock market indicators in level rather than in variation. Rigobon and Sack (2003) use a di⁄erent
approach focussing on measure of market turbulence. D￿ Agostino et al. (2005) set the analysis in terms of stock market
volatility.
10over 6 months of the monthly returns, transformed in quarterly frequency (retma) and, lastly,
the quarterly change in the level of S&P500 index (dsp). In the tests that we will present
below, we also consider the ￿rst and the second lags of all the previous variables.27 Finally,
to test for generic parameter constancy, a time trend t is encompassed among the candidate
transition variables. It should be noted that the choice of the best transition variable among
the alternatives is performed in a subsequent step on the basis of the results of the tests
for nonlinearity. Table 2 reports the value of the so-called LM3 test, a LM-test type with
F-distribution, testing the null hypothesis of linearity.28
ret1m(t) ret1m(t-1) ret1m(t-2) ret3m(t) ret3m(t-1) ret3m(t-2) ret6m(t) ret6m(t-1) ret6m(t-2)
Non augmented F-test 1.6349 3.4286 2.0613 2.4368 3.6146 1.5382 3.67 2.23 0.65
p-values 0.1041 0.0008 0.0326 0.0114 0.0000 0.1342 0.0004 0.0205 0.9603
Augmented F-test 1.3698 2.289 1.7941 2.1185 1.7928 0.8362 2.0835 0.9061 0.87
p-values 0.2003 0.0147 0.0614 0.024 0.0617 0.662 0.0266 0.5857 0.6249
retma(t) retma(t-1) retma(t-2) dsp(t) dsp(t-1) disp(t-2) i(t-1) time
Non augmented F-test 3.5464 3.1586 0.5677 2.1108 5.3841 2.417 2.20008 3.8038
p-values 0.0006 0.0016 0.8831 0.9189 0.0000 0.0121 0.0277 0.0003
Augmented F-test 2.0742 1.5837 0.8854 2.1615 2.3325 2.3297 3.4124 6.3982
p-values 0.0273 0.1117 0.6082 0.0212 0.0129 0.013 0.0007 0.0000
Table 2. F-statistics and p-values of LM3 score tests for STR nonlinearity. Full sample
On consideration of the results, we conclude that there is strong evidence in favour of a
nonlinear speci￿cation of the Taylor-type rules. Both asset prices29 and past interest rates
are likely to be responsible for an alleged nonlinear behaviour of the Fed.
According to the p-values of the tests, the asset prices variable for which linearity is
more strongly rejected is dspt￿1. This does not necessarily entail that the best estimates
of the model have to come from an estimation where dspt￿1 is the transition variable. Any
variable that passes the test for nonlinearity is a potential candidate, and its validity has to be
evaluated on the basis of the overall performance of the estimated model.30 For instance, time
trend turns out to be one of the most signi￿cant transition variables. However, the model
estimated with the time trend as transition variable is neither convincing nor consistent with
market commentary and economic reasoning. Time is, in fact, a special variable; it has to
be interpreted as a source of non-constancy of the parameters rather than a variable driving
regime switches.
5.1 The speci￿cation of the LSTAR model
Whilst a linear Taylor-type rule does quite a good job in describing the overall evolution of
the interest rate over time, it does not allow detection of those policy decisions that have been
guided by considerations not directly related to the changes in the output gap and in￿ ation.
For instance, CBs￿concerns about alleged asset prices misalignments or the ZLB trap play no
role in a linear rule. A possible way to address this issue is to allow the coe¢ cients of the rule
27We do not explore further lags because they would imply an unrealistic delayed response of the central bank to asset
prices misalignments. We do not have any metrics for the fundamental value of asset prices and this prevents us from
investigating the alleged positive and negative bubble components of asset prices.
28For an extensive description of the test see also Lukkonen et al. (1988), and Davies (1978,1987) for the related
nuisance parameters problem.
29It is worth noting that only the measures of asset prices that do not go too far into the past (at most, ￿rst lags)
a⁄ect the linearity of the response. Such ￿ndings corroborate the intuition that asset prices in￿uence monetary policy
only in special circumstances and for limited periods of time.
30We thank Anne Peguin Feisolle for useful clari￿cations on this point.
11to change in the face of events and contingencies.31 Splitting the sample in di⁄erent periods
and estimating di⁄erent parameters is a possible solution but it has major shortcomings.
In particular, the di⁄erent periods must be identi￿ed on the basis of a priori knowledge,
the speci￿cation requires 0/1 (on/o⁄) regime switches, and the coe¢ cients of the variables
relevant only in extreme events have not to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in "normal
times". On the contrary, the nonlinear technique does not require a priori knowledge of time
periods, it does not postulate a 0/1 regime switching behaviour, and it does not impose that
variables such as asset prices are determinants of monetary policy decisions at all times.
If we allow all the parameters in the model to vary across regimes, the linear speci￿cation
can be transformed into:
it = at + b￿;t￿t + by;tyt + ￿1tit￿1 + ￿2tit￿2 + ￿t (6)
where
at = aL ￿ (1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c) + aU ￿ G(lt;￿;c);
b￿;t = bL
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)) + bU
￿ ￿ G(lt;￿;c);
by;t = bL
y ￿ (1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)) + bU
y ￿ G(lt;￿;c);
￿1t = ￿L
1 ￿ (1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)) + ￿U
1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)
￿2t = ￿L
2 ￿ (1 ￿ G(lt;￿;c) + ￿U
2 ￿ G(lt;￿;c)
All the parameters are regime dependent, and, according to the representation introduced
with equation (5), they can be split in lower (￿L) and upper (￿U) regime parameters. We
wish to emphasize that we do not impose any restriction on the speed of transition ￿ and
the threshold c. We allow the data i) to reject the possibility that two extreme regimes
exist, ii) to ￿nd when (if ever) they occur, and iii) to determine what they look like. In
other words, before estimating the nonlinear Taylor-type rule, we cannot say whether the
lower and the upper regimes are coincident or far apart, whether the threshold (when more
than one regimes is present) is positive, negative or equal to zero, and, in the case of asset
prices, whether bubbles or market crashes are relatively more important determinants of the
nonlinearity of the monetary policy behaviour.
When we estimate augmented Taylor-type rules, we proceed in a similar fashion and the
coe¢ cients of the additional terms (zt) follow the same "splitting" treatment of the variables
above. The model in equation (6) can be rewritten as:
it = (1 ￿ G(￿))(aL + bL
￿￿t + bL
yyt + !L0zt) + (G(￿))(aU + bU
￿ ￿t + bU
y yt + !U0zt) + (7)
+￿L
1(1 ￿ G(￿))it￿1 + ￿L
2(1 ￿ G(￿))it￿2 + ￿U
1 G(￿)it￿1 + ￿U
2 G(￿)it￿2
6 Nonlinear estimation: unveiling ￿ner regimes
In this section we report the actual estimates of nonlinear Taylor rules, as speci￿ed in equation
(7), and some comments on the results.
31It is worth stressing that merely augmenting a linear classical rule, as it has been done in the literature, so as to
encompass some measure of asset prices in the speci￿cation, does not give a rule that is suitably ￿exible to pick up rare
events, such as crashes in the equity market.
126.1 The zero lower bound case
In the United States the risk of de￿ ation materialized after the burst of the asset bubble in
200032. Indeed, the aggressive monetary easing mitigated the fallout of the bubble, but it
also drew the interest rate closer to the ZLB. The Fed considered de￿ ation a low probability
contingency for the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, according to Greenspan, it determined an
important change in policy in 2003. It is instructive that Greenspan used this very episode
to explain the risk-management approach that he has been following during his tenure.
￿In the summer of 2003, for example, the Federal Open Market Committee viewed
as very small the probability that the then-gradual decline in in￿ ation would ac-
celerate into a more consequential de￿ ation. But because the implications for the
economy were so dire should that scenario play out, we chose to counter it with
unusually low interest rates￿(Greenspan, 2005).
The relevance, in practice, of the risk-management approach and the crucial role of judg-
ment are even more apparent if we broaden the policy horizon so that more contingencies can
be considered at once. A case in point is provided by the possibility that an asset bubble
bust, requiring an aggressive cut of the interest rate, ends up entrenching the economy in a
liquidity trap.33
These considerations motivated us to investigate if, and to what extent, data could identify
a source of nonlinearity in the U.S. monetary policy generated by concerns on the ZLB and
de￿ ation. The nonlinear estimates for the augmented nonlinear rule are reported in Table
3.34






ρ1 0.9179 0.0383*** 0.7889 0.1028***
ρ2 -0.2561 0.0070***
Speed of transition (γ)
Threshold c
Sum of squared residuals









Table 3. LSTAR estimates. ZLB case (z1is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the
BAA spread )
32See Bernanke (2002) on this point.
33Robinson and Stone (2005) aim at providing an answer to the question of how policymakers should behave in the
face of those contingencies. They conclude that even neglecting the informational di¢ culties facing policymakers in
practice, the optimal policy depends neither linearly nor continuously on the parameters of the economy and time.
34We focus only on the results based on the augmented rule because it overperforms the non-augmented one in all of
the speci￿cations. However, the estimations build on the non-augmented rule are available upon request.
13Figure 5 plots the transition variable and the threshold.35 First of all, we can observe
that the threshold for the interest rate is roughly equal to 3%36, which implies that when
the interest rate falls below that threshold, monetary policy enters a new regime where the
policy instrument does not respond as usual to its determinants. Second, while the estimates
of the NO-ZLB regime do not di⁄er much from the linear ones, we do not identify a proper
alternative Taylor-type rule for the ZLB-regime. The best speci￿cation we manage to ￿nd is
a purely (and highly) autoregressive process.
It is worth stressing that even though the threshold divides the graph into two clear areas,
the transition function is a logistic one, and this entails a smooth transition from one extreme
regime to another. In this case, the speed of transition is su¢ ciently high to imply a relatively
sharp movement from the upper to the lower regime. The transition function is plotted against
the ordered values of the transition variable it￿1 in ￿gure 3.
Figure 3. Transition function against it￿1- ZLB case.
We are aware that the rule we ￿nd for the ZLB regime is far from satisfactory. Even so,
the aim of this work is to see whether ￿ner monetary policy regimes exist, in relation to which
macroeconomic phenomena (i.e. transition variables) and, lastly, whether allowing monetary
policy to deviate from Taylor-type rules improves the ￿t of the model. To tackle the last two
points, we resort both to graphical analysis and to some synthetic econometric indicators.
Starting from the latter, we notice that the Akaike Information Criterion passes from -2.725
of the augmented linear form to -3.101 of the augmented nonlinear one. This suggests there is
an overall improvement in the ￿t of the model. By plotting both the linear and the nonlinear
estimation residuals, we have another tool to compare the ￿t of the model in each period of
time. The inspection of the upper graph in Figure 4 reveals that there is not a big di⁄erence
between the two series of residuals up to 2002. From 2002 onwards, however, things change.
The residuals of the linear estimation (dashed line) ￿rst overshoot and then undershoot zero,
while the residuals of the nonlinear rule (solid line) ￿ uctuate more closely around zero (dotted
line). The lower graph in Figure 4 represents the di⁄erence between the squared linear and
nonlinear residuals. Anytime the line is above zero the residuals of the nonlinear model
are closer to zero than those of the linear speci￿cation; and therefore the nonlinear model
performs better than the linear one. As one can see, this line is constantly above zero after
2001. Interestingly, this span of time coincides with the periods where monetary policymakers
had to face the risk of falling into a ZLB trap. Thus the model succeeds in detecting that
ZLB concerns have a⁄ected the monetary policy, roughly, from 2002 to 2003.
35This makes it easier to associate the various regimes to the time periods they relate to.
36Figure 5 plots the transition variable and the threshold. This makes easier to associate the various regimes to the
time periods they relate to.
14To sum up, allowing the interest rate to be the transition variable driving the switches of
monetary policy across di⁄erent regimes, the model manages to identify two regimes. One
regime (i.e. the NO-ZLB one) is characterised by a monetary policy which is summarized by
a Taylor-type augmented rule. The other regime (i.e. the ZLB one), instead, is characterized
by low and ￿ at interest rates and, not by chance, corresponds roughly to the period when,
according to anecdotal evidence, the economy was considered in danger of falling into a
liquidity trap.
Figure 4. (UP) Residuals from linear (dashed) and nonlinear (solid) Taylor-type rule. ZLB case.
(LOW) Di⁄erence squared linear and nonlinear residuals
Figure 5. Transition variable (it￿1) over time and threshold - ZLB case.
6.2 Asset prices misalignments cases
To study the e⁄ects of asset prices and asset prices misalignments on monetary policy, asset
prices have been encompassed in the speci￿cation of estimated Taylor rules in di⁄erent ways,
according to the role allegedly played in the central bank￿ s decision making process.37 The
approach we propose in this paper treats asset prices as a transition variable in a regime
switching model. Accordingly, asset prices are thought to be responsible for regime switches
in the CB￿ s behaviour.
37In previous studies asset price measures have been included either as an additional regressor in a linear rule or among
the external instruments in a GMM or 2SLS estimation.
156.2.1 The stock market crash (2000-2001)
In the last 5 years, a large debate has grown about the actual relationship between price
stability and ￿nancial instability. This discussion is strictly linked to the broader debate
about the role of asset prices in monetary policy. While the debate has long revolved around
whether price stability does or does not entail ￿nancial stability, the question that can be
posed is slightly di⁄erent and twofold, namely, i) whether ￿nancial instability may jeopardize
price stability, and ii) to what extent CBs have to keep this fact into account.38
In this respect we investigate if ￿nancial instability concerns have actually a⁄ected the
conduct of US monetary policy in a nonlinear way.39 Anecdotal and narrative evidence
suggests that negative price misalignments (i.e. crashes) have a relatively larger importance
than alleged positive misalignments. Until very recently, central bankers strongly objected
to the idea that the CBs had to react to positive asset prices misalignments (i.e. bubbles),
whereas central banks have openly reacted to stock crashes by ￿ ooding the markets with
liquidity. This happened for the Federal Reserve Bank at least twice in the last 20 years
(namely, in 1987 and 2000-2001); in both of the occasions the Bank provided the necessary
liquidity to face the impressive stock markets slumps.40 The Fed intervention when the asset
prices bubble bursted is con￿rmed by what Greenspan claimed in the aftermath of the stock
market crash in 2000:
"The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to
prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we noted in the
previously cited mid-1999 congressional testimony the need to focus on policies to
mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next
expansion" (Greenspan, 2004 p. 36).
This narrative evidence makes it plausible to endorse the hypothesis that the Fed actually
changed its normal/o¢ cial attitude of "benign neglect" vis-￿-vis stock prices when the crashes
occurred. Given the anecdotal evidence of a sudden monetary policy relaxation after any
serious stock market crash, we have an acid test for the ability of our nonlinear method to
capture switches of monetary policy across regimes.41
38According to Borio et al. (2003), during the 90s and the initial years of the new century CBs have been called to face
the new challenge of de￿ning how to incorporate severe boom and bust cycles in asset prices into the monetary policy
framework. They argue that there exist two contradicting views on this regard, and no agreement has been reached
yet. According to one view, the current economic environment is the natural extension of that prevailing during the
in￿ationary period of the late 80s -early 90s. The set of strategic policy responses developed during the period of the
￿ght against in￿ation remains a reliable benchmark because the most recent economic development is nothing but a
series of unusual shocks, which are unlikely to occur again in the near future. This attitude is called the ￿continuity￿
view. In contrast with this view, Borio et al (2003) claim that the actual economic environment has deeply changed
from the past. Financial markets liberalization, low rates of in￿ation, high credibility of central banks￿anti-in￿ation
commitment, and uncertainty about the degree of structural supply-side improvements have produced a totally new
environment. The authors argue that in such a new context the achievement of price stability may be associated with
an increasing risk of ￿nancial instability.
39Dekten and Smets (2004) claim that "Overall, the various linkages between asset prices, ￿nancial stability and
monetary policy are complex because they are inherently nonlinear and involve extreme (tail probability) events. This
implies that simple monetary policy rules may not be appropriate as a guide for monetary policy in such circumstances.
Instead, monetary authorities must take a stance on the probability of such events and evaluate to what extent their
actions may reduce this probability." (2004 p. 28). It follows that "a characterisation of optimal monetary policy
becomes even more complicated when one allows for the probability that a rise in ￿nancial imbalances may results in a
￿nancial crisis with large negative e⁄ects on economic activity and price stability."(Dekten and Smets 2004, p. 8).
40In 1998, Chairman Greenspan noted that, ￿the stock market crash of late October 1987 shifted the balance of
risks, and the Federal Reserve modi￿ed its approach to monetary policy accordingly. In particular took steps to ensure
adequate liquidity in the ￿nancial system during the period of serious turmoil, and ... encourage some decline in short
term interest rates."
41Despite our investigation having no direct predecessors in the literature, other papers have come to similar conclusions
about the crucial importance of stock market crashes. Gerlach-Kristen (2004) uses a latent factor to pick those changes in
the monetary policies that seem to be unrelated to in￿ation and output gap. She ￿nds that the latent factor movements
16As it results from the tests reported in Table 2, it is dspt￿1, the asset prices related variable
that performs best among the various transition candidates.42 The estimates are reported in
Table 4.
Coefficient Estimate St.error Estimate St.error
a 2.7080 1.0312** 2.0403 0.2858***
bπ 0.4720 0.0727***
by 0.1176 0.0319***
ωz1 -0.7972 0.3054** -0.3079 0.0804***
ωz2 -0.4810 0.0783***
ρ1 0.4985 0.1258*** 0.9399 0.1099***
ρ2 -0.2782 0.0796***
Speed of transition (γ)
Threshold (c)












Table 4. LSTAR estimates, transition variable: dsp(t-1). Stock market crash case
(z1is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the BAA spread)
Also in this section, we focus exclusively on the augmented speci￿cation since it out-
performs the non-augmented one both in the linear and in the nonlinear cases. The ￿rst
interesting result is that the estimates of the no-crash regime do not di⁄er much from the
estimates of the linear augmented rule reported in Table 1. Instead, the estimates of the
crash-regime indicate a change in the behaviour of the Fed. The usual indicators, in￿ ation
and output gap, seem not to play any role in setting the interest rate, while the BAA spread
becomes more important and the smoothing decreases. This simple rule suggests that the Fed
faced the stock market crash injecting liquidity and lessening the degree of history-dependence
of the policy, as this approach was likely to be temporary.
This ￿nding is reasonable and conveys the idea that linear Taylor-type rules detect the
broad contours of monetary policy but fail to capture the speci￿cities of the crash period: this
was exactly the twofold hypothesis we aimed at testing with this work. The visual inspection
of ￿gures 6, 7, and 8, which refer to the speci￿cation in Table 4, con￿rms that hypothesis.
follow the occurrence of several special events. She notes that ￿ excessive loosening￿has been practised in the period
2000-2001, that is after the burst of the IT bubble and September 11. Also D￿ agostino, Sala and Surico (2004) ￿nd a
nonlinear behaviour of the FED using a TAR-SVAR model. Their analysis di⁄ers in several points from ours. They use
monthly data, a TAR regime and an augmented Taylor rule in VAR framework. In addition, their analysis is set in terms
of stock market volatility, although it turns out that asset price bursts are associated to the highest volatility periods.
In the paper, the interest rate smoothing estimates are not reported and we cannot compare our results to theirs.
42The estimates associated with ret1mt￿1;ret3mt and ret6mt are also available upon request.
17Figure 6. (UP) Residuals from linear (dashed) and nonlinear (solid) Taylor-type rule. Stock
market crash case. (LOW) Di⁄erence squared linear and nonlinear residuals
Figure 7. Transition function against transition variable (dspt￿1) - Stock Market Crash case.
Figure 8. Transition variable (dspt￿1) and threshold c- Stock Market Crash case.
If we observe the lower graph in ￿gure 6, it is easy to see that the linear and nonlinear
rules produce almost the same residuals during most of the 90s (the line is extremely close to
0), whereas the nonlinear speci￿cation performs better in the crashing period.
It can be shown that the estimates of the no-crash regime are robust in the face of changes
in the transition variable43 and in the speci￿cation of the crash-regime; in contrast, the crash-
regime seems to be sensitive to the transition variable. Indeed, since ret1mt￿1 is also a
valid candidate as a transition variable, we estimate the nonlinear model based on it. The
estimation yields a threshold at zero and a crash-regime in which the Taylor-type rule collapses
in a very persistent autoregressive process.
43The results are available upon request.
18This last result makes the estimation of the crash-regime not completely satisfactory. The
lack of robustness with respect to the choice of the transition variable and a rule which looks
like an autoregressive process (we recall that this was also the case in the analysis of the ZLB)
lead us to consider possible explanations. We focus on three main arguments. The ￿rst one
proposes that only a few observations belong to the special regimes, the ZLB-regime and the
crash-regime respectively. This makes it di¢ cult to estimate the associated parameters and,
in particular, the speed of transition ￿. Unfortunately, there is no solution to such a problem
since the number and the length of the crashing periods in the Greenspan era are given.44
The second explanation we propose contemplates the possibility that the presence of a ZLB
problem just after the crashing period may have a⁄ected the results. One way of solving this
problem consists in cutting the sample so as to leave out the ZLB period.45 This will also
serve as test for the robustness of the results across di⁄erent samples. The third and last
explanation is that our rules lack those variables that actually informed policymakers in the
special periods under investigation. The autoregressive speci￿cation of the crash and ZLB
regimes might conceal an omitted variable problem, as much as we saw it did in the linear
non-augmented case. It is important to notice that the estimates of the no-crash/no-ZLB
regime are quite robust across the di⁄erent speci￿cations. This means that if some variables
are omitted, they are correlated with the regressors of the crash/ZLB regime and not with
those of the whole sample.46
In the light of the previous considerations, we repeat the estimation of the crash case after
dropping the observations from 2002.2 onwards. The linearity test over this shorter sample
suggests the same transition variables candidates we found in the full sample. The results are
reported in Table 5.
44The alternative is to use monthly data. Most of the empirical literature on policy rule that is based on monthly data
(see for instance Clarida et al., 2000) refers to forward looking speci￿cation of the rules and uses GMM or two stage least
squares as estimation methods. Among others, one reason for doing so is that OLS estimations of contemporaneous or
backward looking rules at monthly frequency produces estimates with hard economic interpretation. In addition, OLS
models based on monthly data su⁄er of speci￿cation problems (see for instance the Kesriyeli et al., 2004) that make
unreliable the test for nonlinearity required before proceeding to the STAR estimation. On the contrary, the IV approach
gives reasonable estimates but at cost of quite arbitrary selection of the instruments that would blur the speci￿c role
of the variables, particularly the transition variable, in the nonlinear estimation. Lastly, since policy rules in the sense
proposed by Taylor, and the associated stability conditions, are meant for quarterly frequency, we prefer to stick to
quarterly data.
45Another possibility consists in adopting a multiple regime nonlinear model. In practice, this solution cannot be
pursued because of the use of quarterly data and the short length of the di⁄erent regimes.
46To account for the third possibility we acknowledge another explanatory variable that might have played some role
in the periods under scrutiny. The additional variable we consider is the University of Michigan consumer sentiment
index. The stock market crash usually translates into a sudden fall in consumer con￿dence which, in its turn, anticipates
future reductions in household expenditures. If the central bank is concerned with the long lasting depressing e⁄ects
of a market slump, this variable is a possible proxy of such central bank￿ s worries. Despite its potential informative
power, this variable is never signi￿cant in the speci￿cations we estimate. For this reason, it does not appear in any of
the speci￿cations reported.
19Transition variable
Coefficient Estimate St.error Estimate St.error
Crash regime








a 2.1651 0.2590*** 2.4997 0.3152***
bπ 0.5315 0.6689*** 0.5734 0.0793***
by 0.1321 0.0295*** 0.1237 0.0315***
ωz1 -0.3292 0.0733*** -0.4137 0.0903***
ωz2 -0.4824 0.0816*** -0.5160 0.0947***
ρ1 0.8675 0.1096*** 0.7280 0.1119***
ρ2 -0.2473 0.0706*** -0.1563 0.0798*
Model parameters
Speed of transition (γ) 19.2280 1.6972*** 34.3197 1.6984***
Threshold (c) -36.0690 1.7659*** 0.1085 0.0858
Summary statistics







Table 5. LSTR estimates (sample 1988.3-2002.1). Stock market crash
case. (z1is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the BAA spread).
The estimates of the no-crash regime are quite similar across speci￿cation and pretty close
to the linear Taylor-type rule. As in full sample case, the di⁄erences appear in the crash-
regime estimates. When dspt￿1 is the transition, the CB stops smoothing and drastically
reduces the interest rates. As in the previous estimation, the current output and in￿ ation
measures do not a⁄ect policy decisions as they were not able to provide information on what
would happen in the economy without the intervention of the central bank. On the contrary,
the weight on the Treasury note spread and the BAA spread, which can be seen as a measures
of the investors￿concerns about the future, strongly increases. These results are in line with
the ￿ndings of the full sample estimation based on the same transition variable. The second
speci￿cation in Table 5, where ret1mt￿1 is the transition variable, shows a threshold at zero
and a crash-regime that is not dramatically di⁄erent from the no-crash one. These results
do not look consistent across sample, as the rule of the crash is completely di⁄erent, and
once again they are not robust to changes in the transition variable. In order to understand
those ￿ndings, it is worth looking at the behaviour of the two transition variables and at
the estimated thresholds. When ret1mt￿1 is the transition variable, the threshold is such
that the regime associated to values below the threshold includes not only the period after
2000 (i.e. the crash we are interested in) but also other isolated episodes over the whole
sample. Therefore, the estimated model detects a regime which includes temporary situations
(1 observation each) in which the Bank reasonably did not change its behaviour, as it did
during the crash-regime. Those situations are likely to average out the estimated response to
the crash of the 2000-2001 and to veil the actual speci￿cation of the crash-regime. In contrast,
when dspt￿1 is the transition variable, a clear slump is observable in correspondence of the
20crash and only the observations belonging to this period fall below the threshold. Following
these facts, dspt￿1 is deemed to be a better indicator of the crash of the 2000-2001 and we
should rely on the results associated with it.
To sum up, the Federal Reserve Bank seems to have modi￿ed its reaction function according
to the negative developments of the stock markets. While linear Taylor-type rules seem to be
able to catch the broad features of the decision-making process, they lack power in describing
the central bank policy at the time of the market crash. For sure, if there exist situations that
require central bankers to apply a special dose of judgment, a stock market crash is one of
these and the results suggest that in those situations the usual indicators of monetary policy
are temporarily put on the side. This is in line with the stress Svensson puts on the role of
judgment in policymaking and with what Greenspan later on claimed:
"During 2001, in the aftermath of the bursting of the bubble and the acts of ter-
rorism in September 2001, the federal funds rate was lowered of 4.3
4 percentage
points.[...] We were able to be unusually aggressive in the initial stage of the reces-
sion of 2001 because both in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations were low and stable"
(Greenspan 2004, p. 36).
Taylor-type rules seem to fail if we employ them to describe the monetary policymaking.
Rather, they should be used to provide the public with the broad contours of the monetary
policy and by relaxing the linearity constraint they can be used as a practical benchmark to
ex post detect the operating regimes.
6.2.2 The stock market boom (1994-2000)
As suggested above, the literature holds no conclusive answers about either the actual size of
the asset prices bubble that grew from 1994 to 2000 in the US stock market, or the actual
response of the policymakers in the face of it. It has been largely discussed whether the US
central bank had changed its policy conduct in that period, and many wondered whether it
would have been optimal to do so. More generally, a debate has recently ￿ ourished about
whether and how monetary authorities should take into consideration the evolution of asset
prices in policymaking.47
Despite the large number of contributions, a common position has not yet emerged. It is
beyond the scope of this work to reproduce all the controversial ￿ndings and arguments dis-
seminated in the literature. We believe that the very reasons for the contrasting conclusions
of the various works can be traced back to the existence of two main problems: namely, the
alleged existence of nonlinear relationships between asset prices and macroeconomic variables,
and the fact that asset prices can be driven both by fundamental and non-fundamental forces,
which are hardly distinguishable without the bene￿t of hindsight.48 Furthermore, the debate
about the relevance of asset prices in monetary policymaking has not been con￿ned to the
prescriptive realm. Many authors have empirically investigated whether and, (if yes), how
central banks have actually taken into account asset prices while setting their policy instru-
ments. Very di⁄erent estimation techniques have been adopted to (ex post) detect the actual
role played by asset prices in shaping monetary policy and, unsurprisingly, the conclusions
reached are quite controversial too.49
47See, among others, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000).
48Indeed, the strikingly di⁄erent conclusions diverse authors have developed stem from the various ways these two
facts have been modelled in their works. See, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti et al (2000,
2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Dekten and Smets (2004); Tetlow (2005), Borio and Lowe (2002), Gruen et al (2003),
Bean (2004).
49See, for instance, Siklos et al. (2004), Chadha et al. (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2003).
21Whereas the previous sections contained a rough analysis of what Greenspan asserted to
have done, this section is devoted to testing a more speculative idea. He claimed that the
U.S. monetary authorities almost neglected the growth of the stock market bubble in the late
90s (see his statement in the previous section). The exercise we undertake does not consider
whether or not the Fed tried to burst the bubble, but rather how the monetary policy had
been in￿ uenced (in any direction) by the booming stock market.
One could argue that our estimates in the previous section rule out the existence of a
monetary regime associated to booming asset prices. However, this would not be totally
correct. Our nonlinear estimates do suggest that the stock market crash in 2000 was the main
source of nonlinear behaviour of the Fed, but they do not rule out the possibility that also
booming asset prices had a nonlinear in￿ uence on monetary policymaking. The employed
nonlinear Taylor-type rules reveal the existence of two regimes: a lower one corresponding to
very negative stock returns, and an upper one related to positive and not very negative returns.
Whether other ￿ner regimes, corresponding to boom periods, exist, remains a possibility.
Empirically, an STR model like the one employed here does not allow the detection of more
than two regimes at a time. Therefore, from the estimation, we can at most conclude that the
regime associated to market crashes is empirically more relevant than one possibly associated
to market booms. In order to add a further regime driven by the same transition variable we
would need to resort to a Multiple Regime STR model (MRSTR)50. Further research could
be done along these lines, yet the size of the sample and the complexity of the techniques
involved make it very hard to investigate this possibility.
The timing of the events in our sample, however, is of use. The ZLB and the stock market
crash periods occur at the end of our sample. In order to exclude the overwhelming nonlinear
e⁄ect of the stock market crash, a viable solution is to cut it from the sample: this can be
done without loosing continuity in the data51. Accordingly, the following estimates di⁄er from
the previous ones in that they are conducted over a shorter period of time, precisely between
1988:3 - 2000:1.52 Thus, focusing on this subsample, we explore whether the Fed changed its
policy stance during the late 1990s according to the alleged US stock market bubble.
Due to the cut of the sample we need to update the linear estimation before testing the
nonlinearity of the model. Furthermore, since we aim at isolating a bubble policy regime, we
focus on di⁄erent measures of stock returns and prices (and some lags) as candidate transition
variables.
50Admittedly, it could also be argued that there exist more than two regimes, associated with more than one transition
variable. Extending the model to multiple regimes and multiple transition variables is even more di¢ cult than moving
to a multiple regime model with one transition variable. In addition this approach requires a very high number of
observations, which could only be available through use of monthly data. We already discussed the shortcoming related
to the change of frequency.
51Certainly, this restricts even further the degrees of freedom of the model and requires to take the results with a grain
of salt and care.
52Indeed, in retrospect, the US stock market recorded the all-time high in March 2000, the peak of the bubble before
the crash.
22Non augmented Augmented
Coefficient Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error LR parameter Value Value
a 0.4814 0.1407*** 2.3712 0.2935*** c 2.4047 6.3742
bπ 0.2875 0.0832*** 0.5014 0.0788*** βπ 1.4362 1.3478
by 0.1734 0.0404*** 0.1586 0.0338*** βy 0.8664 0.4262
ωz1 -0.2772 0.0897*** βz1 -0.7450
ωz2 -0.6194 0.1114*** βz2 -1.6651
ρ1 1.3152 0.1133*** 0.8663 0.1124***
ρ2 -0.5153 0.0975*** -0.2383 0.0799***
Sum of squared residuals




Table 6. OLS estimates 1988.3-2000.1 (z1is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the BAA spread )
Table 6 shows the results of the two di⁄erent linear speci￿cations and reports also the long
run parameters. The results of the regressions suggest that, also in this case, the augmented
rule performs better than the standard one.53
We now proceed to test the nonlinearity of both of the speci￿cations. However, since the
aforementioned results suggest that the augmented version is more accurate as a model of
reality, we will concentrate most of our attention on it.
ret1m(t) ret1m(t-1) ret1m(t-2) ret3m(t) ret3m(t-1) ret3m(t-2) ret6m(t) ret6m(t-1) ret6m(t-2)
Non augmented F-test  3.7661  2.3561  2.2478  2.9258  2.8402  1.1217 1.6469 1.6014 1.1312
p-values  0.0013  0.0255  0.0324  0.0074  0.0088  0.3844  0.1258  0.1393  0.9851
Augmented F-test  3.2951  1.8194  3.3332  1.7410  1.4949  2.3913  0.8013  1.3759  1.2734
p-values  0.0057  0.0974  0.0054  0.1146  0.1912  0.0305  0.6902  0.2442  0.3002
retma(t) retma(t-1) retma(t-2) dsp(t) dsp(t-1) disp(t-2)
Non augmented F-test  3.9834  0.1278  1.2956 0.7357 3.1320  2.0488
p-values  0.0009  0.1278  0.2704 0.7295 0.0048  0.0508
Augmented F-test  1.1735  1.9374  2.7430  0.8134  1.1269  1.7794
p-values  0.3651  0.0763  0.0155  0.6785  0.3991  0.1058
Table 7. F-statistics and p-values of LM3 score tests for STR nonlinearity. Sample 1988.3-2000.1
A general overview of the tests (reproduced in Table 7) reveals that dsp (at all lags),
which was an important indicator of the crash, does not appear to be a source of nonlin-
earity here, at least once the rule includes both z1 and z2. The same reasoning applies to
ret3mt￿1;ret6m (at ￿rst lag) and retmat. These results deserve a few comments since they
di⁄er from those obtained over the longer period until 2004. The fact that we reject the
hypothesis of nonlinearity in most of the augmented cases, whereas we cannot reject it while
using the non-augmented version leads to two considerations. On the one hand, what drives
the results of the tests of nonlinearity in the non-augmented version might be a problem of
misspeci￿cation whereas on the other, if we compare these tests to those reported in Table
2, the importance of nonlinearity in the subperiod 1998:3-20001:1 is very limited or nil. This
result alone is a prima facie evidence against the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve Bank
had modi￿ed its reaction function facing an alleged stock market bubble, and this goes exactly
in the direction suggested by Greenspan.
53In particular, as we have already observed in the case of the longer sample, the comparison of the residuals of the
two models shows that the addition of the ltst and the spread improves the ￿t of the rule, especially during the late
1990s. We do not report the graphs that remain available on request.
23We report the results of the LSTR estimations related to the transition variables with the
lower p-values in the augmented form54. Therefore, we consider both ret1mt and ret1mt￿2
as potential transition variables. The results of the LSTAR estimations are very similar for
both of the variables therefore we report only the results for the ￿rst one.
Coefficient Estimate St.error Estimate St.error
a  1.8031  0.3219***  2.5640  0.4161***
bπ  0.4684  0.0858***
by  0.2993  0.0392***  0.1315  0.0433***
ωz1
ωz2  -0.6956  0.1475***  -1.2677  0.1974***
ρ1  0.7188  0.0424***  0.9212  0.0381***
ρ2
Speed of transition (γ)
Threshold (c)













Table 8. LSTAR estimates (Sample 1988.3-2000.1), transition variable retm1. Stock
market boom case (z1is the U.S. Treasury note spread and z2 the BAA spread)
In both cases, the model exhibits instability in the speci￿cation. The threshold jumps from
one extreme to the other of its observed range, passing from positive to negative, with very
few isolated observations in one regime and all the rest in the other one.55 This is a clear sign
that the model is unable to identify two separate monetary policy regimes associated with
the bubble phenomenon.
These ￿ndings do not contradict the results of the tests of nonlinearity. In fact, the LTSR
estimation captures some movements in the Federal Found rate corresponding to extreme
peaks of the transition variable that the linear model is not able to catch. Nonetheless, this
is not enough to state the existence of two di⁄erent regimes. Rather, the outcome suggests
that there is no evidence of change in the policy stance of the Fed during the late 1990s. One
could argue therefore, that Chairman Greenspan had done what he actually claimed to have
done.56 That is, little or nothing. It is commonly accepted that the Fed kept a tight monetary
policy because of the concerns regarding the soaring stock prices. This may be the case, but
such concerns were not driving remarkable changes in the policy approach.
To conclude, all these results suggest that in order to represent the Fed￿ s behaviour from the
1988 to 2000, a linear augmented Taylor rule, including the BAA spread and the di⁄erence in
54For the sake of completeness, we have also estimated the nonlinear non-augmented speci￿cation with the transition
variables associated to the lowest p-values. When the retmat is the transition variable, the two alleged regimes have very
similar speci￿cations, and the threshold leaves few isolated observations below. If the upper regime corresponds to the
bubble regime, it seems to collect almost all observations. Yet, this cannot be the case, because few isolated observations
do not constitute a regime. Using the ret1mt, instead, the threshold is at the bound (necessary for the convergence)
imposed by the technique: just one isolated observation is included in the alleged new regime. This suggests that if there
were no bounds, a second regime would not have been found. If we consider dspt￿1, the same sort of results is obtained.
It is worth noting that none of the models above performs better than the linear augmented rule.
55Further estimations available upon request show this point in detail.
56It is possible that the monetary authorities tried to raise the interest rates in the booming period. This decision,
however, does not constitute a "regime switch" as de￿ned here. It rather refers to a discretionary, one-o⁄ move.
24the long and short term government yields, gives better results than a standard non augmented
and a nonlinear rule. Remarkably, this is particularly true for the last four years.
6.3 Discussion of the results
The technique we have used allows us to split the monetary policy conduct into several regimes
covering the whole sample under scrutiny. Since we manage to identify regimes on a pairwise
basis, we ￿nd that one regime is often short-lived and that it is driven by policymakers￿eco-
nomic considerations about events and contingencies (approximated by means of appropriate
transition variables) and that the other covers the remaining period. The former can be seen
as a "special regime", since it applies only in special circumstances, that is when policymakers
change their policy conduct because of facing important events and contingencies. The non-
special regime contains most of the observations in the sample and can be seen as either the
"remaining average regime", or the "general regime". In e⁄ect, it depicts the broad features
of monetary policy in all the periods other than those in the "special regime". Since most of
the observations in the sample belong to the "general regime", the estimates of the "general
regimes" in each of our cases proxy the coe¢ cients of the linear Taylor speci￿cations. The very
reason why linear Taylor rules pick up the broad behaviour of the monetary policy over long
periods of time is that individual "special regimes" are relatively short and thus average out.
These regimes, however, are extremely important because it is in such special circumstances
that policymakers disconnect the automatic pilot and use their judgment to make decisions.
The linear speci￿cation, by imposing a unique constant regime over the entire sample, fails to
take this point into account and misses all the policy decisions that correspond to ￿ner policy
regimes. It could be argued that we did not manage to disentangle all the ￿ner regimes at
the same time, and that we detected only one regime at the time. This is the reason why the
"non-special" regime in each of our estimations is called the "remaining average regime" or the
"general regime". Yet, the goal of the work was not to identify all the exact rules working in
the ￿ner regimes at the same time, for this would be hardly feasible. Given the available data
and the features of the estimation technique, instead, we have shown the extreme fragility of
the linear Taylor-type rules, the existence of ￿ner policy regimes in correspondence of spe-
cial circumstances, and the misleading conclusions that one could draw by relying on linear
Taylor-type rules. It could be argued that what we call regime switch is, instead, a prolonged
deviation of monetary policy from a "normal" behaviour, which is represented by the linear
Taylor rule. However, if several regimes are present, it is not clear what an "average" linear
rule stands for. We do not exclude the existence of the normal behaviour, however this has
not to be necessarily the estimated linear Taylor rule.
As we argued above, while the "general regimes" estimates seem to be robust to changes
in the transition variable and in the speci￿cation of the "special regimes", it is di¢ cult to
detect meaningful speci￿cations for the rule in these "special regimes".
Since our methodology requires that we ￿nd an economic variable driving the transition
across regimes, in order to identify all the actual monetary policy changes, we would need to
employ as transition variables indicators that directly refer to the uncertainty and the risks
that the policymakers perceive when they decide to keep or change the current monetary
policy conduct. The choice of the transition variable is, therefore, very important and it would
certainly be desirable to select indicators that provide an explicit measure of the policymakers￿
concerns over prospective contingencies. In the next section we discuss the appropriateness
of the indicators used in this work.
257 The relevance of the transition variable
As discussed in the introduction, Greenspan claimed that changes in the monetary policy con-
duct are and should be undertaken according to the "judgment about the probabilities, costs
and bene￿ts of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy" (Greenspan
2004 p.37). Since our methodology requires that we ￿nd an economic variable driving the
transition across regimes, in order to identify all the actual monetary policy changes, we would
need to employ as transition variables indicators that fully re￿ ect the probabilities, the costs
and the bene￿ts of the outcome under an unchanged monetary policy regime. Such indicators
should directly refer to the uncertainty and the risks that the policymakers perceive when they
decide to keep or change the current monetary policy conduct. In what follows we will discuss
the appropriateness of the indicators we have used in this work and we will also provide a
few general comments regarding the relevance of choosing a correct transition variable when
using this methodology.
It could be argued that the indicators employed in our empirical analysis do not directly
measure the perceived consequences, risks and uncertainty connected to the contingencies
mentioned by Greenspan (i.e. the risk of economic instability after the stock market crash
and the risk of ZLB trap in 2002-3). The transition variables we used in the estimation could,
indeed, be seen as mere measures of the economic events occurred in 2001 and 2002-3, and not
necessarily as good indicators of the prospective contingencies.57 Nonetheless, the employed
transition variables capture well the actual switches in monetary policy conduct. Why is this
so?
We argue that while it would certainly be desirable to choose indicators that o⁄er an
explicit measure of the policymakers￿concerns over prospective contingencies, in order to de-
tect actual policy regime switches in practice, it is possible to employ good proxies of them.
When extreme events (i.e. a stock market crash) are the main determinants of future con-
tingencies (i.e. ￿nancial and economic instability or de￿ ation), they can themselves be used
as indicators of the contingencies that policymakers worry about. In e⁄ect, there seems to
be a strong (and intuitive) correlation between the occurrence of extreme events (that we
identify as large di⁄erences of the transition variables from their critical thresholds) and the
implicit risks for the future paths of the economy.58 It is the exceptional nature and the size
of these events that make them good proxies of the actual dangerous contingencies perceived
by the policymakers as threatening the evolution of the economy. Accordingly, we will dis-
tinguish between event-indicators, as those adopted in this work as transition variables, and
contingency-indicators, that more directly re￿ ect the policymakers￿risk-management consid-
erations but are not available in practice. Nonetheless, as long as event-indicators adequately
represent such contingency-indicators, they allow this methodology to capture the monetary
policy regime switches.
In what follows, we will discuss some borderline cases, and, by means of some thought
experiments, we will discuss their potential implications for our methodology. In particular,
we will consider the consequences of i) the lack of extreme events correlated to monetary
policy regime switches, ii) the presence of uncertain, rather than risky, contingencies, and iii)
the choice of the transition variable among alternative and contrasting indicators.
57In the stock market burst case, for instance, it could be argued that negative changes in the stock market prices
represent a measure of the worsened ￿nancial conditions occurred in 2001, but do not reveal the central bankers￿concerns
about the risks that subsequent contraction and de￿ation would have occurred, had they not changed policy conduct.
Similarly, a low level of the interest rates per se can be judged as an ine⁄ective indicator of ZLB risks, which, instead,
also depends on the prospective in￿ation and production paths.
58For instance, very negative changes in the stock prices and very low level of interest rates seem to proxy, respectively,
the risks of economic instability after the stock market crash in 2001 and the risks of falling into a ZLB trap in 2002-3.
26A ￿rst speculative conjecture can be made in light of the observations above. It could be
argued that there might exist a certain class of risks that, despite being able to cause changes
in monetary conduct, are not associated with dramatic economic events. In such cases, event-
indicators cannot be used as proxies for the contingencies, for no dramatic events occur at
all. Imagine, for instance, that the Fed is concerned with the prospect of rapid growth of
a particular economic variable, which is the unique determinant of a dangerous contingency.
If the bank manages to control this variable, it does not undergo any dramatic change and,
therefore, we cannot use it as an indicator to identify ex-post the regime switch. In order
to empirically detect these more subtle types of policy switches with our methodology, it
would be necessary to ￿nd (or build) indicators that truly re￿ ect those concerns that induce
policymakers to modify their conduct. Neither event-indicators nor contingency-indicators
would be available.
A second borderline case occurs when policymakers face uncertainty about the prospective
evolution of the economy. In such a case, even if dramatic events actually occur, policymakers
may decide not to change their policy because they are not sure of the best strategy to pursue.
According to Greenspan￿ s account, this is likely to have happened in the case of the stock
market bubble period. The monetary policymakers acknowledged the possible existence of
a stock market bubble, yet chose not to react because they were not sure about the e⁄ects
and the appropriateness of their intervention. In such a case, the fast and steady growth
of the asset prices can be seen as a dramatic event, but it cannot portray the policymakers￿
cautious considerations. To put it bluntly, if uncertainty prevents policymakers from changing
monetary policy conduct, no indicator is relevant because there is no policy regime switch.
Interestingly, if we take Greenspan at his word, it would be of little utility to ￿nd a better
indicator of the actual policymakers￿concerns over the rasing bubble because the latter group
did not engender any monetary policy regime switch. Any attempt to change the indicator
so as to detect a switch that never occurred would, obviously, be in vain.
To conclude, we would like to tackle another thought experiment that regards a possibly
relevant contingency we have not yet tested for. Let us consider the steady worsening of the
external ￿nancial position of the US in the last years, and the two prospective contingencies
associated with it, namely "hard landing" and "gradual adjustment". Some economists have
argued that there exists a serious risk of "hard landing" for the US economy; others have
asserted that the situation is sustainable and a "gradual adjustment" process is likely to
occur. Greenspan seems to agree with the latter class of positions since has warned against
over-emphasizing the possible dangers of such ￿nancial situation. Nonetheless, it is not fully
clear whether the bank has ever changed its conduct because of concerns regarding such
daunting external ￿nancial positions. For argument￿ s sake, let us assume that the bank has
indeed modi￿ed its conduct when the likelihood of a "hard landing" contingency has reached
a certain level. According to the discussion above, in order to detect this policy regime switch
with the proposed methodology, we would need to choose an indicator that subsumes the
perceived risks of a "hard landing" contingency. Two possible indicators are available: the
￿rst one is the volume of the US net external debt, while the second one is the US long
term yields on newly issued debt. The ￿rst measure is an event-indicator but it proxies the
perceived risks of a "hard landing" contingency because the higher is the level of the debt, the
sharper and the more likely is the impact of the expected adjustment. The second measure,
which refers to a ￿nancial variable, is not an event-indicator and depends on the expectations
that private and public investors have about the likelihood of a future market reversal.59 In
practice, the actual behaviour of these variables in the last months was very di⁄erent: while
59It goes without saying that this latter indicator can be useful at the condition that market expectations are close to
those of the central bank. We assume that this is the case.
27the debt has grown relentlessly, the yields have almost remained unchanged (In passing, note
that this seems to suggest that the markets are not too worried). It follows that variables
performing so di⁄erently cannot be interchangeable indicators of the (assumed) change in
the policy conduct. Taken for granted that a monetary policy regime switch occurred, the
debt-indicator would probably lead to detection of the regime change. On the contrary, the
yields-indicator would probably prevent this from being done.
This thought experiment shows the importance of choosing the correct indicators while
trying to detect actual monetary policy changes using actual data and a nonlinear Taylor-
type rule. Moreover, this example has a more subtle implication: it is possible not to detect
an actual policy regime switch if the wrong indicator is adopted as a transition variable.60
It is worth recalling that this is only an error Type II. An error Type I, that is ￿nding a
policy change where there is none, does not depend on the choice of the transition variable.
Admittedly, another kind of error could occur. If the employed indicator that is thought
proxying a certain contingency A also represents a di⁄erent contingency B, we risk attributing
the reason of an empirically detected regime switch to the wrong cause. The possibility of
incurring such an interpretational error reinforces the importance of carefully choosing the
indicator to employ.
8 Closing remarks
In this paper we estimate nonlinear Taylor-type rules for the US monetary policy over the
last 17 years. In light of the performance of estimated linear Taylor-type rules and in view
of narrative evidence, we investigate if monetary policy has followed a nonlinear behaviour
and has di⁄ered across regimes. In our analysis, the identi￿cation and de￿nition of a regime
does not depend on its time length but, rather, on how much the course of monetary policy
is a⁄ected by events and contingencies. We are aware of the di¢ culties entrenched in this
approach. First, the shorter the regime, the more di¢ cult is for existing econometric tools to
detect it. Second, the more a regime depends on information that is di¢ cult to extrapolate
from available data, the more di¢ cult is its identi￿cation. Nonetheless, we maintain this
approach because we believe that ￿ner monetary regimes matter in that events and contin-
gencies, independently from their duration, are able to dramatically a⁄ect the evolution of
the economy.
A ￿rst look at our results suggests that, while the Taylor rule describes the broad contours
of the Fed￿ s behaviour relatively well, the US monetary authorities have often been in￿ uenced
by the occurrence of particular phenomena, such as the stock market collapse and the danger
of falling into the ZLB trap. Building on this view, we argue that linear Taylor-type rules
tend to hide important ￿ner regimes. We support this conjecture by investigating regimes
like the stock market crash or the ZLB danger by means of a nonlinear estimation method.
Indeed, an important advantage of a nonlinear investigation, with respect to a linear one,
is that it allows detection of medium size regimes, which are characterised by information
contained in publicly available data. These regimes are su¢ ciently short to be diluted (and,
therefore, missed) by a linear rule, but su¢ ciently long to be captured by a nonlinear one. On
the basis of our results, we conclude that estimated linear reaction functions are averages of
several ￿ner regimes￿rules: the descriptive power of the former fades directly with the variety
of the occurring regimes. The results also suggest that the number of econometric-identi￿able
60It is theoretically possible that we have failed to detect a monetary policy change in the booming stock market
period because we chose an "imperfect" transition variable. That is to say that, if the growth of asset prices per se
(that is a mere event) does not proxy the perceived risks and costs of a following market crash, using them as transition
variable may lead to misleading conclusions. However, this reservation would only be valid as long as an actual regime
change has occurred and this is at odds with market commentary and Greenspan￿ s account of the Fed￿stance.
28regimes is probably less than the one actually occurring. Therefore, a nonlinear investigation
is certainly an important step forward in identifying ￿ner and ￿ner regimes, yet it may still
overlook some of them.61
Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that linear estimations are weighted averages of actual
regimes￿rules where the weights re￿ ect only the length of the regimes, and not necessarily
their actual relevance. This may be misleading since, in practice, one crucial determinant of
the importance of a regime is the potential evolution that it may initiate in the economy. One
could even argue that the utility from being able to describe monetary policy in such "normal"
periods is very limited. In other words, if a linear Taylor-type rule helps understanding
decisions made when everything is ￿ne, then it explains what is already almost intelligible
even without resorting to the rule. Accordingly, our ￿ndings seem to suggest that linear
Taylor-type rules fail to explain what represents the most interesting aspect of monetary
policy, namely, judgment.62
Furthermore, noticing that the number and variety of the regimes directly depend on
the uncertainty in the economy that multiplies contingencies, our results suggest an inverse
relation between the utility of Taylor-type rules and the uncertainty in the economy. Finally,
adding a note concerning an open economy, to the extent that openness increases the exposure
to uncertainty we expect the scope of these results to be even greater.
Thus, we propose a truly new way of looking at the descriptive properties of Taylor-type
rules: it re￿ ects the theoretical shortcomings of the Taylor rules, it includes the concept of
judgment, and it still conserves some descriptive power for this popular tool of monetary
policy analysis.
Summing up:
1. The nonlinear investigation shows that for the US the linear Taylor rule is a weighted
average of at least three regimes ("general", crash and ZLB related), where the weights
are the number of observations of any regime.
2. Thus, by induction, the outcome of a linear estimation can be seen as a weighted average
of the various regimes taking place.
3. The nonlinear estimation we use can identify some of, but not all, the actual regimes.
Indeed, a regime may be too short and/or it can be di¢ cult to identify a times series
that is able to portray the information characterizing such regime.
4. Taylor-type rules are unlikely to pick up the exact monetary policymaking decision
process; their descriptive power declines with the uncertainty, i.e. number of contin-
gencies in the economy. However, they preserve some of their utility. They provide
some information about the policy conduct in "normal" times and, they can also be
employed to investigate whether, when and why central banks have strayed away from
their "standard" conduct.
61Other potential ￿ner regimes that could have escaped from the medium sized meshes of the nonlinear investigation
could be related to the 1998 liquidity crisis and September 11 terrorist attacks. As Greenspan (2004, p. 38) put it, this
events "prompted the type of massive ease that as been the historic mandate of a central bank".
62Greenspan claimed that " In pursuing a risk management approach to policy, we must confront the fact that only a
limited number or risks can be quanti￿ed with any con￿dence. [..] As a result, risk management often involves signi￿cant
judgment on the part of policymakers, as we evaluate the risks of di⁄erent events and the probability that our actions
will alter those risks. For such judgment, policymakers have needed to reach beyond models to broader, thought less
mathematically precise, hypotheses about how the world works." (Greenspan, 2004)
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33A Appendix. Testing for nonlinearity
A.1 Properties of the logistic transition function
The logistic transition function exhibits the following properties:
i) 0 ￿ G(lt;￿;c) ￿ 1,
ii) G(c;￿;c) = 0:5,
iii) If ￿ ￿! 1, the change in G(lt;￿;c) from 0 to 1 is almost instantaneous at lt = c
and therefore the logistic function tends to behave like the indicator function I[lt > c] of the
two regimes. G(lt;￿;c) becomes a step function and a STR model collapses into a threshold
model, nested in LSTR as a special case
iv) If ￿ ￿! 0;G(lt;￿;c) becomes a constant (0.5) and ￿ = 0 makes the model a linear one.
A.2 Testing against LSTAR
Luukkonen, Saikkonen and Terasvirta (1988) propose estimating a ￿rst order Taylor approx-
imation around ￿ = 0. The test using this form has little power when the constants ￿1;0 and
￿2;0 are di⁄erent across regimes but the slope parameters not. This problem can be overcome
by means of a third order Taylor approximation which looks like
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t + et (9)
where et = "t + (￿2 ￿ ￿1)0xtR3(lt;￿;c) . The null hypothesis of linearity is equivalent to
H00
0 : ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = 0. This test is an LM-type test , called LM3: LM3 has a ￿2 distribution
with 3(p+1) degrees of freedom.63. If the null H00
0 is rejected, we cannot reject the alternative
63Speci￿c cases
a) A note of caution while using LM1 and LM3 should be added. If lt = yt￿d with d￿p, then the terms ￿i;0li
t for
i=1,2,3 should be dropped from the auxiliary equation to avoid multicollinearity.
b) If the transition variable lt is not included in xt, then auxiliary equation can be simpli￿ed to a more parsimounious
version of it which nonetheless allows to detect di⁄erences in ￿1;0 and ￿2;0 when ￿1j = ￿2j for j = 1;:::;p:








and the null hypothesis H00
0 : ￿1 = 0 and ￿2;0 = ￿3;0 = 0. The resulting test statistics is called LMe
3 and it is
distributed as a ￿2 distribution with p+3 degrees of freedom.
c) If the transition variable lt = yt￿d, a simpli￿cation can be operated equally by exploiting the fact that the only














The null becomes H00
0 : ￿1 = 0 and ￿2;d = ￿3;d = 0:The LMe
3 in this case is distributed as a ￿2 distribution with p+3
degrees of freedom.




















This is a LM3 statistics with p(p + 1)/2 + 2p2 degrees of freedom. (A simpli￿ed LM1 statistics for this speci￿c case




A.3 LM versus F statistics
In small samples, F statistics can perform better than LM statistics and this applies to our
sample we covers 17 years only. For both the LM and the F statistics, we estimate the linear













distributed as a ￿2 with 3(p+1) degrees of freedom ( p+1 is the number of regressors in the
linear speci￿cation) and
F =
(SSR0 ￿ SSR1)=3(p + 1)
SSR1=T ￿ 4(p + 1)
(11)
distributed as a F-statistics with 3(p+1) and T-4(p+1) degrees of freedom. The null hypoth-
esis of the various tests do not change and we do not repeat them here.
B Appendix. The modelling cycle
In what follows we brie￿ y describe the procedure (that, as suggested by Granger (1993), is
recommended to be speci￿c-to-general) that is to be followed in nonlinear modelling. We list
below the speci￿c steps for modelling and estimating a nonlinear STR model.
1. Specify a linear model and choose the correct number of lags (in the case of an autoregres-
sive process). Since the STR models require that the error terms are no autocorrelated,
this ￿rst step of the modelling process is particularly important.64
2. Once an acceptable linear speci￿cation is obtained, test the null hypothesis of linearity
against the alternative of (STR) nonlinearity. While this test does not require (at this
stage) the choice of a speci￿c functional form for G(￿), the most appropriate functional
form can be chosen afterwards on the basis of the results of the nonlinearity tests. Repeat
this test for all the possible candidate to be a transition variables.
3. If the linear model is rejected, choose the most appropriate transition variable among
the possible candidates (and among lags of the candidates) according to a statistical
criterion as AIC or the p-values of the LM tests.
4. On the basis of the tests above and according to economic reasoning, choose the most
appropriate functional form for G(￿):
would have p(p+1)/2 d.f.). Note that the cross products have to be for i 6= j in order to avoid perfect multicollinareity.
This test is a general test of non-linearity.
64Often the rejection of linearity stems from the misspeci￿cation. of the functional linear form; such a ￿nding should
suggest the researcher to inspect the linear representation with classical tests and, if necessary, to apply the opportune
modi￿cations
355. Estimate the parameters of the STR model by a quasi-maximum likelihood technique.
6. Evaluate the model using appropriate diagnostic tests, recalling that only a few test
statistics maintain their asymptotic distribution and their validity in a nonlinear envi-
ronment.
7. On the basis of the tests￿result, change the model where necessary. Repeat the steps
2, 3, 4, 5 if either further nonlinearity or parameter instability is detected and requires
additional modelling.
C Appendix. Possible rationales of interest rate smoothing.
There exists a long series of plausible reasons why CBs prefer to smooth interest rates65. We
focus on this theoretical point because it is crucial to understanding the motivations for the
speci￿c functional form we estimate. There are at least three di⁄erent classes of motivation
for central banks￿interest rates smoothing behaviour. The ￿rst class of explanations re￿ ects
the idea that interest smoothing increases the e⁄ectiveness and the optimality of the mone-
tary policy.66 The second school of thought develops the idea that ￿nancial markets dislike
interest rate volatility67. Banks, in particular, are often exposed to and severely a⁄ected by
abrupt changes in interest rates68. Finally, the third class of explanations turns around CBs￿
reputation-building processes and communication strategies69. In addition to all these theo-
retical explanations, it is worth quoting Blinder who, while he was still vice-president of the
Fed, admitted that ￿..a little stodginess at the central bank is entirely appropriate￿(1995, p.
13). Without digging into the speci￿c pros and cons of these explanations, it is appropriate
to conclude that the interest smoothing component in the Taylor rule can be more than an
ad-hoc addition to empirical estimated rules. Indeed, it is likely to subsume a series of central
banks￿concerns and worries, which a classical rule would not be able to capture.70
65For an overview, see Lowe and Ellis (1997), Rudebusch (2002), and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
66Woodford (2001, 2003) claims that some interest rate smoothing is desirable because it allows discretionary monetary
policy equilibrium to approximate the superior commitment equilibrium. Adding interest rate smoothing among the
targets of the bank may result in "history dependent central-bank behaviour which, when anticipated by the private
sector, can serve the bank￿ s stabilization objectives through the e⁄ects upon current outcomes of anticipated future
policy.￿(Woodford 2003 pp.861-862). Amato and Laubach (1999), among other authors, support the view that interest
smoothing makes decisions more predictable, which, in turn, increases policy e⁄ectiveness. A di⁄erent argument is
made by Orphanides (1998), Rudebusch (2001), Sack and Wieland (2000), who maintain that real time data are often
non-accurate and CBs prefer to be relatively cautious. Aoki (2003) raises the issue of noisy indicators for the variables
and argues in favour of monetary policy cautiousness.
67Volatile short-term interest rates induce high volatility in all the other ￿nancial assets and a⁄ect discounting.
68Goodfriend (1987) and Cuckierman (1996) claim that CBs dislike frequent reversions of interest rates to reduce
the systemic risks linked to the banking exposure and the volatility in the ￿nancial markets. Goodfriend (1991),
Rudebusch(1995), Roley and Sellon (1995) and Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) argue that little short-term interest
rate volatility guarantees the CB acquires a better control over long run bond yields, and, therefore, on the whole economy.
(Admittedly, it could be argues that, this line of argument does not di⁄er in substance from Woodford (2003)￿ s history
dependence). Lowe and Ellis (1997) maintain that the authorities dislike the costs associate to repeated interest rate
reversals. According to Bullard and Schaling (2002), the volatility of the asset prices in the ￿nancial markets depends,
among other factors, on the volatility of the short-term interest rates via no-abitrage relationships. It could be argued
that, if the CB has a preference for ￿nancial stability, a certain degree of interest rates smoothing could be intentionally
aimed at containing volatility.
69Caplin and Leahy (1997), and Goodhart (1999) argue that frequent decisional changes may give the impression
of indecision on the part of the CB. Lowe and Ellis (1997), Kuttner (2001), and Goodfriend (1991) observe that the
announcement e⁄ect is bigger when the change is considered persistent, that is when there is a certain amount of inertia
in the rates.
70Admittedly, Svensson (2003 pp.462-3) does not sympathise with most of the motivations illustrated. He is not
fully convinced by the arguments that could fall into the second and the third classes above. Moreover, he claims
that the relevance of history dependence (i.e. the ￿rst class above) is not established, and, even if history dependence
actually matters, "a commitment to an optimal speci￿c targeting rule is a more direct way of achieving such history-
dependence."(2003 p. 462). The latter sounds as a rather prescriptive claim that, despite relevant, does not exclude the
Federal Reserve Bank has actually tried to smooth the changes in the interest rates in the last 17 years.
36Appendix. Diagnostic analysis
At the end of any nonlinear estimation, diagnostic tests for serial correlation, remaining
nonlinearity and parameter constancy are usually performed. The following tables contain
the p-values associated with these various test-statistics. The null hypothesis of each test
is the lack of serial correlation in the residuals, the absence of additional nonlinearity, and
parameter constancy. We produce the results for the main speci￿cations considered in the
paper.
The tests for residual serial correlation fail to reject the null hypothesis of no residual cor-
relation in almost all the speci￿cations. The bubble case is the only exception. The presence
of serial correlation in the residuals suggests that the nonlinear model is not satisfactory, as
it was already argued in the paper on the basis of the previous results.
The second diagnostic test considers time as an alleged second transition variable71. This
is a test against a Time-Varying STAR model, which allows for both nonlinear dynamics and
time-varying parameters. In practice, it tests parameter constancy against the alternative
of smoothly changing parameters in the two-regime STAR model. In most of the cases, the
results lead to reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy. This would suggest the
possible existence of a further regime, which has time as a transition variable. However, we
recall that, in the initial tests, the variable time already seemed to be a plausible transition
variable but the associated estimation was meaningless. Therefore, although reporting the
result of this test, we suggest not overestimating its implications.
Lastly, we test the models for remaining nonlinearity. The null hypothesis of no additional
nonlinearity can often be rejected. This result depends on the speci￿cation of the model
and on the choice of the transition candidates. We believe that this ￿nding is in line with
the analysis previously conducted. Indeed, although di⁄erent regimes ( such as ZLB and
crash) have probably coexisted in the long period considered, in each estimation we manage
to deal only with one of them at a time. Therefore, it is not surprising to ￿nd that in the
stock market crash case, for instance, there is some evidence of remaining nonlinearity in the
interest rate, we had not dealt with. This reasoning is con￿rmed by the fact that, when we
reduce the sample so as to focus on the bubble, we eliminate the observations associated to
two of the three identi￿ed regimes (which cluster in the last part of the sample), and remaining
nonlinearity is largely rejected72.
To conclude, the results of the diagnostic tests seem in line with our previous ￿ndings.
There seems to be strong evidence that at least three monetary regimes have characterised
the Fed￿ s monetary policy over the 17 years under investigation. While we cannot exclude
that other ￿ner, smaller and shorter regimes are equally present, the power of the diagnostic
tests and the limited number of observations do not allow a more subtle analysis.
71The three LM speci￿cations refer to the ￿rst, the second and the third order Taylor approximation of the transition
function.
72Admittedly, the null hypothesis of no additional non linearity can be rejected only when ⁄r(-1) is the transition
candidate. This is consistent with the results found for the ZLB case. In the period 1993-1995, the interest rate is
quite low and ￿at. Although there is no evident risk of falling into a ZLB trap, the interest rates seem to behave quite
oddly. This could plausibly be the reason why we fail to reject additional nonlinearity connected to ⁄r(-1) found in the
diagnostic tests for all the sample periods.
37Order 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
p-value 0.1718 0.5421 0.1944 0.339 0.1625 0.3882 0.1237 0.0986
LMc1 LMc2 LMc3 LMc1 LMc2 LMc3








































CRASH. Augmented, transition dsp(t-1)
Serial correlation
Parameter constancy










Order 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Order 1 2 3 4
p-value 0.1566 0.3699 0.1380 0.0891 0.0227 0.4346 0.1950 0.0813 p-value 0.0137 0.0222 0.0205 0.0201
LMc1 LMc2 LMc3 LMc1 LMc2 LMc3 LMc1 LMc2 LMc3
p-value 0.4478 0.0013 0.0014 0.1921 0.0334 0.3213 p-value 0.0029 0.0000 0.0025






























































Quadratic term (p-value) Quadratic term (p-value)




Serial correlation Serial correlation
Augmented,  transition ret1m(-1)
Parameter constancy
Table A2. Diagnostic tests for Stock Market Crash estimations (sample 1988.3-2002.1) and Stock Market Boom
estimation (sample 1988.3-2001.1)
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